The Trump administration has quietly opened preliminary discussions on potential military strikes against Iran, even as the country is convulsed by the most sustained anti-regime protests in decades. The deliberations underscore how domestic unrest in Iran is intersecting with a more confrontational U.S. posture, raising profound questions about the future of the Islamic Republic and the risks of a wider regional conflict.

At the core of these talks, according to U.S. officials cited in recent reporting, is a menu of contingency plans that includes the possibility of large-scale airstrikes on multiple Iranian military facilities. These discussions have not yet produced any decision, and U.S. officials insist that no forces have been repositioned and no strike is imminent. Still, the very fact that the Pentagon and senior administration figures are mapping out target sets—while protests continue to spread across Iranian cities—signals a new phase in Washington’s approach to Tehran.

The planning comes amid a convergence of three dynamics:

– Historic unrest inside Iran, with nationwide protests met by lethal repression.
– Escalating U.S. rhetoric, as President Donald Trump warns Iran’s leaders they will “have to pay hell” if security forces keep killing demonstrators.
– A recent precedent for direct U.S. strikes on Iranian soil, including a June operation using “bunker buster” bombs against the Fordow nuclear site and other fortified targets, reportedly coordinated with Israel.

Against this backdrop, the administration’s internal debate is not just about if and when to use force, but about whether U.S. military power should be tied explicitly to the fate of Iran’s protest movement—and what that might unleash.

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Planning for a Potential Strike

According to officials who spoke with U.S. media, Pentagon planners and senior policymakers are discussing which specific Iranian targets might be hit in the event Trump orders strikes. Options reportedly under review include:

– A broad aerial campaign against multiple military facilities, likely focused on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), air defense assets, and command-and-control nodes.
– More limited strikes calibrated as punishment for regime violence against protesters, meant to degrade selected capabilities without triggering a full-scale war.

Officials stress that such planning is “routine” contingency work—a standard feature of U.S. military posture toward adversarial states. They also emphasize that:

– No U.S. troops or equipment have been repositioned toward Iran specifically for this purpose.
– There is no consensus within Washington on the scope, trigger, or timing of any potential action.

Yet this is not contingency planning in a vacuum. It follows a June operation in which Trump ordered the first acknowledged U.S. attack on Iranian territory, using “bunker buster” munitions against the deeply buried Fordow nuclear facility and other fortified sites, in coordination with Israel during a flare-up in Iranian–Israeli tensions. That strike demonstrated both capability and political willingness—facts not lost on Tehran.

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An Uprising Unlike Previous Waves

The internal Iranian context is crucial to understanding why Washington is now revisiting its military options.

Since late December, anti-government protests have persisted across Iran, driven by deep economic distress, corruption, and anger at decades of authoritarian rule. Rights groups and local monitors report:

– At least 36–65 people killed in the crackdown, with some estimates suggesting the true toll may be significantly higher.
– More than 2,000 people arrested or detained, including activists, students, and local organizers.
– Public threats by Iranian authorities that demonstrators and their supporters could face the death penalty.

In an effort to contain the unrest and disrupt organizing, the government has imposed a nationwide internet blackout at key moments, sharply limiting Iranians’ ability to communicate with each other and the outside world.

Analysts note that this wave of protests is broader and more sustained than many previous cycles of dissent. Some reporting suggests that senior regime insiders may already be contemplating a post-Islamic Republic future, amid signs of fragmentation and elite anxiety. From Washington’s perspective, this raises both opportunities and risks: the possibility of genuine political change in Iran, but also the danger that external pressure or military action could harden the regime’s resolve or derail a homegrown movement.

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Trump’s Rhetoric: Support, Threats, and Strategic Ambiguity

Trump has sought to align himself rhetorically with Iran’s protesters while simultaneously brandishing the threat of U.S. military force.

In a post on Truth Social, he declared that “America stands ready to help” the Iranian people, asserting that Iran is “looking at FREEDOM, perhaps like never before.” During a radio interview, he warned that if the regime’s forces “start killing people,” the United States will “hit them really hard.” He has repeated that Iran’s leaders will “have to pay hell” if the killing continues.

This messaging serves several purposes:

– It signals moral and political support to protesters who have directly appealed to Trump for protection and international backing.
– It warns Tehran that the repression of demonstrations could cross a red line and trigger military consequences.
– It maintains strategic ambiguity, allowing the administration to keep multiple options open while avoiding a clear commitment to intervention.

At the same time, Trump has so far refused to formally embrace exiled opposition leaders, including Prince Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last shah. He has stated he will not meet Pahlavi “at this point,” preferring to see who emerges from the unrest as a legitimate representative of the Iranian people. That posture suggests a desire to retain flexibility and avoid betting too early on any single opposition figure.

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Lessons from a Hard History of U.S. Intervention

Any U.S. discussion of coercive action in Iran is inevitably colored by the legacy of 1953, when the CIA helped orchestrate a coup against democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and reinstall the Shah. That operation—and the Shah’s subsequent autocratic rule—was a central grievance that fueled the 1979 Islamic Revolution and decades of anti-American sentiment.

Since the 1979 hostage crisis, conflict between Washington and Tehran has mostly played out through:

– Diplomatic confrontation and sanctions
– Covert action and cyber operations, such as the Stuxnet virus targeting nuclear infrastructure
– Proxy conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and the broader Gulf

Direct overt strikes on Iranian soil have been rare but not unprecedented. Beyond the recent bunker-buster attacks, Trump’s first term saw the assassination of IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani in early 2020, a move that shattered long-standing taboos around targeting top Iranian officials. In 2025, he ordered a bombing campaign against selected nuclear sites, further entrenching Iranian perceptions of a U.S. willingness to use force.

This track record feeds into what some analysts describe as Trump’s application of the “madman theory”—deliberately cultivating unpredictability and a reputation for risk-taking, in hopes of gaining leverage over adversaries. According to Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group, this history makes Iran’s leadership acutely aware that Trump is both “willing” and “able” to take major risks, adding to their dilemmas as they try to gauge whether threats of new strikes are bluff or prelude.

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How a Strike Might Reshape the Region

Any new U.S. military action against Iran would reverberate far beyond the immediate targets. Several implications stand out.

1. U.S.–Iran relations and escalation risk

A major air campaign, or even limited punitive strikes, would likely:

– Trigger direct or proxy retaliation by Iran against U.S. forces and bases across the Middle East, as seen in previous IRGC missile attacks on U.S. installations.
– Further collapse diplomatic channels, making any future agreement on Iran’s nuclear program or regional behavior even more remote.
– Strengthen hardline narratives in Tehran that view the U.S. as irredeemably hostile, potentially undermining more pragmatic factions within the regime.

Vaez notes that Iran “is still a country that has the ability to inflict significant harm on the U.S. and its interests in the region,” with short-range missiles and naval capabilities that were not fully employed even in past retaliatory episodes. Any U.S. strike must therefore reckon with the possibility of a rapid cycle of escalation.

2. Israeli–Iranian dynamics

Israel has conducted repeated strikes on Iranian assets in Syria and, increasingly, inside Iran itself as part of its campaign against the country’s nuclear and regional activities. The June bunker-buster operation was reportedly coordinated with Israeli forces during a period of heightened tension, illustrating the depth of U.S.–Israeli security cooperation.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could see renewed unrest and U.S. planning as an opening to:

– Argue for broader joint action to weaken Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.
– Press Washington to exploit what he might frame as a moment of regime vulnerability.

But any expanded campaign risks entrenching a multi-front confrontation involving Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf, with high potential for miscalculation.

3. The trajectory of Iran’s protest movement

For Iran’s protesters, U.S. military action is a double-edged sword:

– On one hand, explicit U.S. backing and credible threats against regime violence could embolden demonstrators and deter the most extreme forms of repression. Some activists have already appealed for international protection.
– On the other hand, overt U.S. strikes could give the regime a pretext to frame the uprising as a foreign-backed plot, justify harsher crackdowns, and rally parts of the population around national defense.

The regime is deeply embedded in Iran’s economy and security architecture; simply removing top leaders or degrading military facilities is unlikely, by itself, to deliver a stable or democratic outcome. As Vaez and others argue, Iran is “weakened, but not weak,” and any attempt at externally driven regime change would face serious resistance and likely produce long-term instability.

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Strategic Calculus Inside Washington

Within the Trump administration, the conversation over Iran is occurring alongside other flashpoints—Venezuela, Cuba, Greenland, and ongoing competition with Russia and China—that are stretching U.S. diplomatic and military bandwidth. This global agenda shapes how officials weigh costs and benefits:

– A decisive blow against Iran’s military infrastructure could be framed domestically as a demonstration of strength, especially in the wake of previous strikes and the Soleimani assassination.
– But prolonged confrontation with Iran would almost certainly become a quagmire, diverting resources from other priorities such as great-power competition and commitments to allies like Taiwan and Ukraine.

Moreover, the administration has historically shown limited appetite for the long-term nation-building and humanitarian commitments that would be required if Iran were to experience a rapid regime collapse. That reality tempers enthusiasm among many in the national security establishment for any military path that might accelerate internal disintegration without a clear plan for what comes next.

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Strategic Ambiguity as Policy

For now, the White House appears to be embracing a strategy of calculated ambiguity:

– Publicly, Trump voices strong support for protesters, issues sharp warnings to Iran’s leadership, and highlights that “America stands ready to help.”
– Privately, officials refine target lists and operational concepts but insist that no decision has been taken and that planning is “preliminary.”

This dual track allows the administration to:

– Maintain pressure on Tehran without immediately committing to military action.
– Signal to protesters that Washington is attentive to their struggle, while avoiding explicit promises of intervention that could prove politically or militarily untenable.
– Preserve the option to move quickly if a triggering event—such as a massacre of demonstrators or a major attack on U.S. personnel by Iranian proxies—alters the risk calculus.

At the same time, this posture increases uncertainty for all actors. Iranian leaders must assume that some U.S. threats are credible, and may respond by heightening their own readiness or leaning more heavily on repression. Protesters may overestimate the likelihood of U.S. rescue, while regional actors—from Gulf monarchies to Israel—will hedge against both escalation and sudden U.S. retrenchment.

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A Dangerous Crossroads

As Iran faces one of the most serious internal challenges to its system in nearly half a century, the Trump administration’s evolving military contingency planning represents a critical variable in an already volatile equation. The intersection of:

– A restive and emboldened population under severe economic and political strain
– An entrenched but anxious regime with substantial coercive capacity
– An American president who has repeatedly shown willingness to use force and cultivate unpredictability

creates a set of scenarios in which missteps by any side could quickly spiral.

Whether Washington ultimately chooses to move from contingency plans to execution orders will depend on decisions in both capitals: how far Iran’s leaders go in repressing dissent, whether protest momentum grows or wanes, and how the administration balances its desire to punish and deter Tehran against the risks of a major regional conflict.

For now, the U.S. message is stark but conditional: Iran is warned, the protesters are praised, and the Pentagon is quietly doing the math on what a strike would look like—should the moment come.

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