Iran is witnessing its largest and deadliest wave of anti-government unrest in years, with activists reporting dozens to potentially hundreds killed as protesters directly challenge the authority of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Conflicting casualty figures, sweeping internet shutdowns, and official denials have obscured the true scale of the bloodshed even as the protests spread across all 31 provinces.

The unrest began on 28 December 2025, when a severe currency crisis and soaring inflation triggered demonstrations by traders and shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar. What started as anger over economic collapse and chronic mismanagement quickly transformed into an explicitly political uprising, with crowds chanting “Death to Khamenei” and calling for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. Verified footage shared by rights groups and media outlets has shown large crowds confronting heavily armed security forces, contradicting state television claims that the unrest is “contained.”

At the heart of the crisis is a stark and dangerous information gap. Rights groups, local doctors, and international organizations are offering radically different estimates of the death toll:

– The U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) has documented at least 65 deaths as of 9 January, including 29 adult protesters, 5 minors, and 4 security officers. HRANA also reports more than 2,300 arrests.
– An investigative report cited by *Time* magazine quotes a Tehran doctor who says at least 217 protesters were killed in six Tehran hospitals alone, most by live ammunition.
– Another HRANA-based summary carried by Anadolu Agency lists 42 documented fatalities—34 protesters and 8 security personnel—along with 2,217 detained.
– Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, evaluating a narrower time window from 31 December 2025 to 3 January 2026, have confirmed at least 28 people killed in 13 cities across eight provinces, including children, all shot by security forces.

The scale of the discrepancy—ranging from roughly 40 to more than 200 deaths—illustrates how difficult it has become to establish even basic facts inside Iran. Authorities have imposed extensive internet and telecommunications shutdowns, limiting the circulation of videos, eyewitness accounts, and casualty reports. Hospitals are reportedly under pressure to mislabel gunshot wounds, and families have been threatened into silence or coerced into appearing on state television to attribute deaths to “rioters” or accidents. In some cases, officials have allegedly threatened secret burials if families refuse to comply.

Despite the blackout, rights monitors and journalists have managed to piece together a picture of a sprawling national revolt. HRANA and other trackers say protests have occurred in all 31 provinces, with social media videos and rights group verifications indicating participation in more than 100 cities and towns. Demonstrations have swept through major urban centers such as Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Esfahan, and Kermanshah, but also smaller and historically marginalized regions including Lorestan, Ilam, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Hamedan, Qom, and parts of the Kurdish west.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch describe a pattern of lethal repression. Security forces—including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij paramilitary, and the national police—have repeatedly resorted to:

– Rifles and shotguns loaded with metal pellets
– Live ammunition fired into crowds
– Tear gas, water cannon, and beatings to disperse largely peaceful gatherings

In places such as Azna in Lorestan and Malekshahi in Ilam province, verified videos show security personnel firing from inside bases directly into groups of unarmed protesters. Witnesses told rights investigators that IRGC agents “opened fire from inside the base, shooting … without regard for who they shot”, killing several on the spot and wounding many more. The dead in these areas include named individuals such as Reza Azimzadeh, Latif Karimi, and Mehdi Emamipour, with others succumbing to injuries days later.

The crackdown has been accompanied by an openly uncompromising rhetoric from the highest levels of the state. On 3 January 2026, the day rights groups say at least 11 protesters were killed, Ayatollah Khamenei denounced demonstrators as “rioters” and declared that they “should be put in their place.” The IRGC’s provincial command in Lorestan announced that a period of “tolerance” was over and pledged to target “rioters, organizers and leaders of anti-security movements … without leniency.” Senior officials consistently describe the protests as foreign-backed sedition rather than a homegrown rebellion rooted in crushing economic distress and deep-seated demands for political change.

Yet the slogans echoing through Iran’s streets tell a different story. The messaging has evolved rapidly from economic to explicitly political demands. Protesters chant “Death to Khamenei,” “Down with the dictator,” “Long live the Shah,” and “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran,” signaling a rejection of the state’s ideological priorities and regional interventions. These slogans invoke memories of both the 1979 revolution and the monarchy that preceded it, while expressing anger at resources spent abroad in places like Lebanon and Gaza rather than on domestic needs.

A notable feature of this wave of unrest is its broad demographic participation. While students and young people are still visible on the front lines, rights groups and video evidence show middle-aged and elderly citizens, workers, traders, and women of all ages joining in. The involvement of ethnic minorities—including Kurds, Lors, and others in the western provinces—adds a volatile dimension, raising concerns that continued repression could deepen longstanding grievances and fuel centrifugal pressures on the state.

Internationally, the protests have drawn intense attention, not least because of the explicit calls for regime change and the visible use of lethal force by authorities. The Trump administration has repeatedly voiced support for the demonstrators and has issued warnings to Tehran. In a public statement, President Donald Trump threatened that the United States would “hit [Iran] very hard” if the authorities began killing protesters, invoking Iran’s history of violent crackdowns. U.S. officials have used the unrest to argue that sanctions and pressure are exposing the regime’s vulnerabilities.

Tehran has responded by framing the protests as evidence of an American-orchestrated plot. Khamenei and other senior figures accuse Trump of having “hands stained with the blood of Iranians,” portraying Washington’s declarations of solidarity as cynical interference. This narrative serves two purposes: it attempts to delegitimize domestic dissent as foreign manipulation, and it lays groundwork for justifying harsh repression in the name of national security.

Another external actor seeking to shape the moment is Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince and son of the last shah. Speaking from abroad, Pahlavi has called on protesters to overwhelm security forces and seize control of towns and cities, casting himself as a unifying opposition figure. He presents the uprising as an opportunity to end clerical rule and restore a secular, monarchist—or at least post-theocratic—order. However, it remains unclear how much real sway he holds inside Iran, where many citizens may be hostile to both the existing regime and the return of a monarchy.

The protests also underscore the Islamic Republic’s growing crisis of legitimacy. Decades of sanctions, corruption, and mismanagement have produced chronic unemployment, rampant inflation, and deteriorating public services, including water and electricity. The late 2025 currency collapse, which saw the rial plunging against the dollar, intensified the sense that authorities are both unable and unwilling to address basic economic needs. When bazaar traders—traditionally seen as a pillar of the regime’s social base—took to the streets over the currency crisis, it signaled a worrying erosion of support in segments once considered loyal.

In this context, the state’s reliance on brute force and information control carries serious long-term risks. Internet shutdowns and telecommunications disruptions may temporarily blunt the protesters’ ability to coordinate, but they also damage the economy and deepen public resentment. The deliberate suppression of casualty data, combined with coercion of victims’ families, further undermines trust in official institutions. Each verified video that surfaces from inside the blackout—showing gunfire into crowds or bodies in the streets—becomes a powerful counter-narrative to state claims of restraint.

At the same time, the opposition faces its own structural challenges. Despite the unprecedented geographical spread and diversity of the uprising, there is no single cohesive leadership directing strategy or articulating a unified program for what might replace the current system. This decentralization makes the movement harder for authorities to decapitate, but it also complicates any transition scenario. Exiled figures such as Reza Pahlavi, as well as diaspora networks and satellite media, are attempting to provide symbolic leadership, yet their legitimacy inside the country is contested.

The stakes are high. Analysts and rights advocates warn that without meaningful concessions or reforms, Iran could be headed toward a prolonged standoff between an increasingly militarized state and a population that has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to risk death to demand change. The disputed death toll itself has become a symbol of this confrontation: a measure not just of lives lost, but of a regime’s determination to control the narrative at all costs.

What is clear, even amid the fog of censorship and conflicting numbers, is that dozens—and plausibly hundreds—of Iranians have been killed in the latest protests, overwhelmingly by state forces using unlawful or excessive force. Thousands more have been injured or detained, and countless families are now entangled in a system that often punishes dissent with prison, torture, and, in some cases, the death penalty. For many inside Iran, the question is no longer whether the system can be reformed from within, but whether it can survive at all if it continues to respond to popular demands with bullets and blackout.

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