Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration that he wants to end US military aid to Israel within a decade marks one of the most consequential strategic pivots in the history of the US‑Israel relationship. Framed by Netanyahu as proof that Israel has “come of age,” the move aims to recast Israel from a heavily subsidized ally into a largely self‑financed regional military power, even as it maintains a close security partnership with Washington.
In a wide‑ranging interview with *The Economist*, Netanyahu said he wants to “taper off the military aid within the next 10 years” and confirmed that this meant reducing it “to zero.” The remark was not offhand. He described the policy as “in the works,” signaling an organized, long‑term strategy rather than a rhetorical flourish. The announcement comes as Israel’s economy and defense budget expand rapidly, and after a Gaza war in which temporary Western restrictions on arms transfers exposed the vulnerabilities of relying on foreign suppliers.
At stake is far more than a budget line. US aid has been a core pillar of both Israel’s security doctrine and Washington’s Middle East strategy for decades. Netanyahu’s plan implicitly asks whether a more self‑reliant Israel will strengthen or dilute that partnership—and whether “independence” from American funding will translate into greater strategic freedom, or simply a differently structured interdependence.
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A historic aid framework under reconsideration
Under the current memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in 2016 and implemented starting in 2018, Israel receives $3.8 billion annually in US military assistance, almost entirely earmarked for the purchase of American-made weapons systems. This 10-year agreement runs through 2028, and negotiations over the next framework have already begun.
For decades, US security assistance has been justified in Washington as a way to:
– Maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge over regional adversaries.
– Anchor a close US ally in a volatile region.
– Promote interoperability and technology-sharing that benefit both militaries.
The cumulative scale is enormous. According to estimates cited in international coverage, Israel has received more than $300 billion, in inflation-adjusted terms, in US economic and military support since 1948. US aid once constituted a large share of Israel’s total defense spending; as Israel’s economy grew, that share steadily declined, even as nominal US support rose.
Netanyahu’s comments therefore break with a long tradition of Israeli leaders who, even when preferring more autonomy, treated US military aid as politically sacrosanct. By publicly stating he does not intend to seek full renewal of the $3.8 billion package beyond 2028, he is inviting a structural rethink of the relationship.
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Netanyahu’s argument: “We’ve come of age”
Netanyahu’s case rests on a simple premise: Israel is now wealthy and capable enough to pay for its own defense.
He told *The Economist* and later described to other outlets that in his December meeting at Mar‑a‑Lago he informed former President Donald Trump that Israel “very deeply appreciate[s] the military aid that America has given us over the years.” But he immediately followed this with a different message: “We’ve come of age, and we’ve developed incredible capacity.”
His argument has several pillars:
– Economic strength: Netanyahu projects that Israel’s economy will reach about $1 trillion within a decade, moving it firmly into the ranks of medium‑to‑large advanced economies. In that context, he implies, continued dependence on external funding is no longer appropriate.
– Growing defense budget: Under Israel’s 2025 budget, total defense spending has reached a record NIS 136 billion (about $36.9 billion), with the Defense Ministry alone accounting for NIS 110 billion (around $29 billion). In other words, the current annual US aid represents only a fraction of Israel’s own defense outlays.
– Maturity and sovereignty: Politically, Netanyahu frames this as a national maturation. “We want to be as independent as possible,” he said, adding that Israel had “developed incredible capacities” and that this was part of “coming of age.”
When pressed by *The Economist*’s editor Zanny Minton Beddoes whether he truly intended to taper aid “to zero,” Netanyahu answered “Yes,” and described the process as already “in the works.” He simultaneously stressed that this did not mean disengaging from the US: he vowed to “continue to fight for the allegiance and support of the American people” and argued that financial independence would not weaken the alliance.
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The Gaza war and the shock of conditional support
Beyond economics and symbolism, the recent Gaza war appears to have been a decisive catalyst. During the conflict, several Western partners, including the Biden administration, temporarily held up or restricted transfers of certain munitions in response to political and humanitarian concerns. Some European countries also paused or reviewed arms exports.
For Netanyahu and his security team, these episodes underscored the strategic cost of dependence. If critical ammunition or systems can be delayed at moments of peak need, then reliance on foreign stockpiles is not just a budgetary convenience; it is a vulnerability.
According to reporting on Israeli discussions, part of the push to end or radically reduce aid stems from frustration over these wartime delays. By accelerating the development of an independent arms industry and reducing exposure to political conditions in Washington and European capitals, Netanyahu aims to ensure that core military capabilities are fully under Israeli control.
This perspective also informs his public diplomacy. In his *Economist* interview, Netanyahu linked financial independence to public perception, suggesting that reduced reliance on US funds might help Israel in the “propaganda war” waged against it on social media and international platforms. If critics can no longer argue that Israel is effectively waging war “on the American taxpayer’s dime,” some in Jerusalem believe, it may blunt a line of attack that has resonated in parts of Western public opinion.
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Building a domestic military-industrial powerhouse
The most concrete expression of this shift is Israel’s plan to massively ramp up domestic weapons production. Netanyahu has disclosed that Israel intends to invest 350 billion shekels (about $110 billion) in building an independent arms industry over the coming years. This is in addition to the already expanded annual defense budget.
Such an investment would:
– Deepen Israel’s existing strengths in missile defense, drones, cyber, electronic warfare, and intelligence systems.
– Allow Israel to produce a larger share of its own munitions and platforms, reducing reliance on US factories and supply chains.
– Potentially position Israel as an even more significant arms exporter, giving it economic and diplomatic leverage in regions like Asia, Europe, and Africa.
In practice, Israel already has a sophisticated defense sector—companies such as Rafael, Israel Aerospace Industries, and Elbit Systems are major global players. The new investment signals an ambition to shift the balance from foreign procurement toward self‑sufficiency, particularly in critical munitions that proved vulnerable to export controls during the Gaza war.
The scale—$110 billion—is also a domestic industrial policy decision. It promises jobs, research, and technological spillovers into the civilian high‑tech sector. For Netanyahu, long associated with Israel’s economic liberalization and tech boom, this dovetails naturally with his broader narrative of national resilience and innovation.
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Washington’s reaction: between relief and recalculation
Netanyahu’s declaration landed in a complex political environment in Washington. On the one hand, parts of the US public—especially within Donald Trump’s populist base—have grown increasingly critical of foreign aid, including to Israel. On the other, traditional bipartisan support for Israeli security remains strong in Congress.
Senator Lindsey Graham, a leading Republican hawk and chair of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee overseeing foreign assistance, quickly embraced Netanyahu’s statement. In a public response, he praised Israel’s effort to become more “self‑sufficient” and argued that if this was the direction Israel genuinely wanted, “we need not wait ten years.”
Graham pledged to present a proposal to “dramatically expedite the timetable” for phasing out aid, suggesting that the funds saved could be “plowed back into the US military,” thereby reframing the change as a win both for Israel’s independence and for American taxpayers. Coming from one of Israel’s most vocal supporters on Capitol Hill, this endorsement gives Netanyahu political cover in Washington and underscores the bipartisan appeal of reduced aid:
– Fiscal conservatives and isolationists see budgetary savings and reduced foreign entanglements.
– Pro‑Israel hawks can argue that a wealthy, self‑financing Israel demonstrates strength and reliability, not abandonment.
However, Netanyahu’s position is not fully aligned with all prior expectations. Reporting in late 2025 indicated that Israeli and US officials had begun talks on a new MOU, with Israel initially exploring not only renewal but potentially expansion of the existing package to a 20-year framework. Netanyahu publicly denied those reports and is now openly charting a different course, which will require both governments to rethink their assumptions about the future architecture of the alliance.
Congress ultimately controls the purse strings. Even if Israel seeks to end the formal aid framework, lawmakers could still seek alternative mechanisms—such as joint programs, loan guarantees, or special appropriations in crises—to sustain a high level of strategic intimacy. The debate in Washington will thus focus not just on whether to continue aid, but on what replaces it.
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Strategic independence without strategic distance?
Netanyahu is careful to draw a distinction between financial independence and strategic alignment. In his interview, he reiterated that he would continue to “fight for the allegiance and support of the American people,” and he has repeatedly emphasized the indispensability of the US‑Israel relationship.
Several dynamics suggest that even without direct aid, the partnership will remain central:
– Operational cooperation: The United States and Israel recently carried out joint strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, severely degrading Tehran’s capabilities and, in Netanyahu’s telling, relegating Iran from a preeminent to a “second-rate” power. Such operations rely less on money flows and more on shared intelligence, planning, and technology.
– Technology-sharing and co‑development: Joint programs—such as missile defense systems—provide mutual benefits beyond any aid line item. Israel’s innovations frequently feed back into US defense technology, while American platforms enhance Israeli capabilities.
– Regional signaling: A close US‑Israel bond remains a core deterrent signal to adversaries like Iran and Hezbollah, regardless of whether it is underpinned by formal aid.
Netanyahu’s hope appears to be that by removing or reducing the financial dependency, he can both:
– Lessen American leverage over operational decisions (for example, in Gaza or future conflicts).
– Improve Israel’s international image, by making it harder for critics to portray it as a client state funded by US taxpayers.
Whether this will work is uncertain. Critics may simply shift their arguments to target Israel’s own defense spending or its arms exports. Moreover, Washington may seek to retain leverage through other channels, such as export licenses for sensitive technologies or diplomatic backing in international forums.
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Regional ramifications and perception
In the Middle East, Netanyahu’s announcement will be read as both continuity and escalation.
On one level, an Israel that can fully finance its own defense is not fundamentally new: the IDF already relies heavily on domestic production and local R&D. On another level, a $110 billion investment in arms production and a record defense budget signal a further deepening of Israel’s military edge over its neighbors.
For Arab states and Iran, several implications follow:
– Military balance: Israel’s self-sufficiency could widen the qualitative gap in advanced technologies, particularly in areas like missile defense and cyber.
– Diplomatic narratives: Some regional actors have long attacked US aid as evidence of American “bias.” If aid tapers off, they may adjust their rhetoric, but Israel’s military superiority will remain central to their grievances.
– Arms markets: A more export-oriented Israeli defense industry could compete more aggressively in global arms markets, including in states that are not formally aligned with the West.
Netanyahu’s comments on Iran in the same *Economist* interview highlight the intertwined nature of these issues. He pointed to the joint US‑Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear program and the regime’s “terrible mismanagement” at home, suggesting that the combination of external setbacks and internal protests could create conditions for profound change inside Iran. Here again, Israel’s military capacity—whether US-funded or self-funded—remains a central tool in its strategic calculus.
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A new negotiation baseline for 2028 and beyond
All of this flows into the looming post‑2028 negotiation over a new security framework. Netanyahu’s stated intention “not to seek [the MOU’s] full renewal” creates a new baseline. Instead of asking “How much aid?”, the question becomes “What kind of relationship?”:
– Scaled-down or transitional assistance: Israel may favor a gradual taper that aligns with ramped-up domestic investment, rather than an abrupt cutoff.
– Programmatic cooperation: Washington and Jerusalem could focus more on specific joint projects, R&D partnerships, and intelligence-sharing frameworks that do not take the form of direct annual transfers.
– Crisis mechanisms: Both sides may preserve tools for rapid support in major wars—such as emergency resupply or special appropriations—without an open-ended standing aid commitment.
For American policymakers, Netanyahu’s stance intersects with broader debates about America’s global role. Those advocating restraint or reduced foreign obligations may point to Israel’s self-financing as a model: wealthy allies taking on greater burdens for their own defense, thereby freeing US resources for domestic or other strategic priorities. Traditional internationalists, however, may argue that formal aid agreements are valuable not just for security but also for political alignment and influence.
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Independence or reconfiguration?
Netanyahu’s plan to end US military aid within a decade is framed as an assertion of independence, but in practice it is more accurately described as a reconfiguration of an already dense relationship.
Israel is not seeking to step away from US technology, intelligence, or diplomatic backing. Rather, it is betting that a richer, more militarily capable Israel can stand more firmly on its own financial feet, while still cooperating closely with the United States on shared threats—above all, Iran and its regional network of proxies.
The move also reflects lessons learned from the Gaza war and from shifting political winds in Washington. As American domestic debates over foreign policy become more polarized, and as elements of Trump’s base question long-standing foreign commitments, Israeli leaders are calculating that reducing dependence today may prevent vulnerability tomorrow.
Whether this strategy will ultimately enhance Israel’s security and its global standing—or whether it will erode some of the structural guarantees embedded in formal US aid—will depend on how both countries manage the transition. What is clear is that Netanyahu has chosen a moment of relative economic strength and military success to announce what he views as Israel’s “coming of age”: a state determined to be “as independent as possible,” even as it remains bound to its most important ally by interests deeper than any annual check.
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